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Autobiography 
Born on September 2nd, 1992, I am a fifth-year student at the University of Mary 
Washington and a double major in Latin and Computer Science. Ever since 7th grade 
when I received my first homeschooled lessons in Latin from my mother (a Classics 
major herself), I have been fascinated by the history of ancient Rome, particularly the 
enormous successes of its famous legionary armies (this can also be heavily attributed 
to a game named Rome: Total War that I received as a gift in 8th grade). My interest in 
it was so strong that I saved up my money to buy not one, but two sets of Roman 
armor, and to this day I will still put on the steel lorica segmentata for costumed 
events and guest exhibitions in classes (ranging from elementary school to CLAS 110 
here at UMW). It was unsurprising therefore that I should choose a topic revolving 
around one of the Romans’ greatest victories for my senior thesis, especially since the 
main question the thesis asks is one that I myself have often wondered at throughout 
the years. And it is my sincere hope that you will enjoy exploring this topic as much 
as I have. 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of why Hannibal Barca suffered such a decisive 
defeat at the hands of Scipio Africanus in the Battle of Zama. I begin by conducting a 
thorough analysis of the two ancient sources that have provided us with the bulk of 
what is known about the battle and the events leading up to it. My analysis of them 
primarily concerns itself with determining how objective and trustworthy these 
accounts are, and as such how much faith can be placed in the details they provide. 
Using these sources, I then proceed to examine the events leading up to the Battle of 
Zama itself, specifically Scipio’s campaign in North Africa and how his strategic 
decisions and maneuvers ultimately forced Hannibal to return to North Africa and 
confront him. I then conduct an analysis of the battle itself and each general’s tactical 
performance. Before drawing my own conclusions as to why Hannibal lost, I review 
the texts of scholars who have also written on the subject to determine what they 
believe were the factors responsible for Hannibal’s defeat, categorizing them into two 
major schools of thought. Finally, I choose one side and then add my own 
contributions as to why Scipio Africanus triumphed in the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On my honor, I attest that I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this 
assignment. 
Signed, 
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Introduction and Thesis Statement 
 On October 19, 202 BC, six Roman legions under the command of Publius 
Cornelius Scipio confronted a Carthaginian army led by the most dreaded general of 
the ancient world: Hannibal Barca, scourge of Italy and the man responsible for some 
of the most humiliating defeats Rome would ever suffer in its long history. The stakes 
could not have been higher for either side; a Carthaginian victory  would leave the 
recent Roman conquests of Spain completely vulnerable to a counter-attack by 
Hannibal's triumphant army, and the reclamation of the country would give Carthage 
both the resources and location it needed to continue its war against Rome.1 On the 
other hand, a Roman victory would spell the end of Carthage as a power in the 
Mediterranean. With its economy and military in ruins, it would be completely at the 
mercy of Scipio and the Roman senate, who would be free to force upon the 
Carthaginians whatever terms they wished. And after a long and bloody struggle 
between the two armies, now known as the Battle of Zama, this second scenario is 
exactly what ensued. His army routed, Hannibal was forced to flee, and with him fled 
any hopes of Carthage defying Rome. Scipio earned the title of “Africanus” for his 
decisive victory and imposed a peace treaty that destroyed what little remained of 
Carthage's navy and finances, leaving Rome free to pursue its conquest of the rest of 
the Mediterranean world.2 Such was the price of Hannibal's failure.  
 But how did this come to pass? How did a general who is credited with some 
of the most remarkable victories in all of history suddenly suffer a crushing defeat to 
an army that he outnumbered, and in his own homeland of North Africa no less? I 
intend to show through this paper that Hannibal Barca lost the Battle of Zama long 
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before it even began. Scipio Africanus gained the strategic advantage over him with a 
series of brilliant maneuvers and battles in Spain and North Africa that crippled the 
rest of Carthage's military forces and allies, leaving Hannibal no choice but to depart 
from Italy and return to a homeland that he had not stepped foot on since he was nine 
years old. Scipio then pressed the advantage and forced Hannibal into fighting a battle 
that the Carthaginian army was unprepared for, and on a battlefield that gave a very 
strong tactical edge to the Romans. By the time the fighting commenced, Hannibal 
was left with chance for victory, and what little opportunity he did have to turn the 
tide of the battle fell through. In the end, despite his extraordinary accomplishments 
as a general, Hannibal lost Zama because he could neither match the strategic 
prowess of Scipio Africanus, nor find a way to overcome his Roman adversary’s 
tactics. 
 In order to demonstrate this, we must first turn to the two men who have 
provided us with the vast majority of what we know about Zama: Titus Livius 
Patavianus, or simply Livy, and Polybius. I shall conduct an analysis of their 
reliability, and then turn to examining the events leading up to and during the Battle 
of Zama as depicted by them, beginning with Scipio's landing on the coast of North 
Africa. Following this, I will include a review of scholarship that has also been done 
on this subject, before drawing my own conclusions regarding why the battle played 
out in such a fashion. 
Analysis of Polybius as a Historian 
 Of these two ancient historians, Polybius is probably the lesser known, but 
this is in no way a reflection of his credibility as a historian. On the contrary, Polybius 
6 
has developed a reputation for being one of the most objective and reliable historians 
in all of classical antiquity, and his Histories are frequently consulted by those who 
wish to learn more about the Roman wars waged against Carthage and Macedon.3 
Polybius himself makes it very clear in his Histories that he believes the role of the 
historian is to offer the truth and nothing but the truth, no matter what their personal 
feelings on the matter at hand might be: 
ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἦθος ἀναλαμβάνῃ τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρὴ 
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς 
μεγίστοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, 
πολλάκις δ᾽ ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδίστως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, 
ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἁμαρτίαι τοῦθ᾽ ὑποδεικνύωσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ 
ζῴου τῶν ὄψεων ἀφαιρεθεισῶν ἀχρειοῦται τὸ ὅλον, οὕτως ἐξ ἱστορίας 
ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται 
διήγημα.  
Polybius Histories, 1.5-6 
 
But he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore 
everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak 
good of his enemies and honor them with the highest praises while 
criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the 
errors of their conduct impose this duty on him. For just as a living 
creature which has lost its eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if 
History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale.4 
 
 Polybius' devotion to the preservation of fact, free from bias and with no 
details excluded, is further supported by the remarkable extents to which he would go 
to research his subject matter. In addition to the great number of connections he 
developed in order to obtain as much information as possible, among them Scipio 
Aemilianus, the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus himself and the commander of 
the Roman army that ultimately sacked Carthage in the Third Punic War, Polybius 
also personally traveled to the locations of some of the Second Punic War's most 
important events.5 The most outstanding of these, and the one that best illustrates his 
7 
incredible diligence, is his crossing of the Alps in order to follow in the footsteps of 
Hannibal's army.6 
 Polybius was especially well suited to the analysis and writing of military 
history due to his own military background. He served under the Romans in their 
campaign against the Galatian Gauls of Asia Minor in 189 BC, and he would later 
become a hipparchus, a cavalry officer, of the Achaean League during the third war 
between Macedon and Rome.7 His friendship with Scipio Aemilianus resulted in him 
being invited to take part in the negotiations that preceded the Third Punic War, and 
afterwards he accompanied Scipio to Africa where he experienced firsthand the siege 
and subsequent sacking of Carthage. He was even present for the razing of Corinth in 
the same year.8 This extensive experience gave Polybius a profound understanding of 
classical warfare, which is frequently demonstrated by his lengthy and superbly 
detailed descriptions of tactics, equipment, formations, army composition, and troop 
types.  
 We cannot however rely solely upon Polybius' Histories as our primary source 
for Zama and the Second Punic War in general, the predominant reason being that of 
the forty volumes he wrote, only the first five have survived the ages fully intact. 
Another reason can be inferred from a statement that Polybius makes in Book XII 
regarding how he collects most of his information:  
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πράξεις ἅμα πολλαχῇ συντελοῦνται, παρεῖναι δὲ τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἀδύνατον, ὁμοίως γε 
μὴν οὐδ᾽ αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην τόπων 
καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἰδιωμάτων τὸν ἕνα δυνατόν, καταλείπεται 
πυνθάνεσθαι μὲν ὡς παρὰ πλείστων, πιστεύειν δὲ τοῖς ἀξίοις πίστεως, 
κριτὴν δ᾽ εἶναι τῶν προσπιπτόντων μὴ κακόν.  
Polybius Histories, 12.4c.4-5 
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For since many events occur at the same time in different places, and 
one man cannot be in several places at one time, nor is it possible for a 
single man to have seen with his own eyes every place in the world 
and all the peculiar features of different places, the only thing left for 
an historian is to inquire from as many people as possible, to believe 
those worthy of belief and to be an adequate critic of the reports that 
reach him.  
 
 “To believe those worthy of belief” implies that in many cases Polybius had 
no means of corroborating a person's account beyond his own judgment call 
regarding their trustworthiness, meaning that there could be numerous cases 
throughout the Histories where the only evidence for what was presented as fact was 
the testimony of an individual that Polybius deemed to be “worthy of belief”. It 
should be noted though that we are doing almost exactly the same thing by placing 
our faith and trust in Polybius and his alleged adherence to the truth in the cases 
where we have little to no other evidence available. 
 The final reason as to why we should be cautious in relying exclusively on 
Polybius is one that he himself acknowledges: 
ὃ δὴ κἂν ἐγὼ παρακαλέσαιμι περὶ αὑτοῦ τοὺς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς 
ἐπιγινομένους, ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ πρόθεσιν εὑρισκώμεθά που κατὰ τὴν 
πραγματείαν διαψευδόμενοι καὶ παρορῶντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 
ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπιτιμᾶν, ἐὰν δὲ κατ᾽ ἄγνοιαν, συγγνώμην ἔχειν, καὶ 
μάλιστα πάντων ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συντάξεως καὶ διὰ τὴν 
καθόλου περιβολὴν τῶν πραγμάτων.  
Polybius Histories, 16.20.8-9 
 
And I too will beg both my contemporaries and future generations in 
pronouncing on my work, if they ever find me making misstatements 
or neglecting the truth intentionally to censure me relentlessly, but if I 
merely err owing to ignorance to pardon me, especially in view of the 
magnitude of the work and its comprehensive treatment of events.  
 
A very understandable shortcoming given the age in which he lived, but one 
nonetheless that we should be mindful of. An example of this can be found when 
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Polybius describes the location of Zama, where Hannibal encamped shortly before the 
battle took place: 
μετὰ δέ τινας ἡμέρας ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρύμητα τόπων 
προῆλθε καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ Ζάμαν: αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ πόλις 
ἀπέχουσα Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν πέντε.  
Polybius Histories, 15.5.3 
 
After a few days he shifted his camp from the neighborhood of 
Adrumentum and advancing encamped near Zama. This is a town 
lying five days' journey to the west of Carthage. 
 
 “Five days' journey to the west of Carthage” is a very vague description 
regarding the location of a town, and it has made the task of determining the 
battlefield's location considerably difficult, and to this day the only proof regarding 
the location of Zama has been speculative at best.9 For this reason, and for those 
listed above, it would be prudent to consult a second primary source, and for this 
purpose we shall now turn to Livy and his Ab Urbe Condita. 
Analysis of Livy as a Historian 
 The first thing that should be noted about Livy is how different he is from 
Polybius. Whereas Polybius had an extensive military background and was well-
versed in the affairs of politics, Livy was a scholar with minimal personal experience 
in either.10 This different background can be readily seen from the very different style 
with which Livy writes compared to Polybius; whereas the latter is so focused on the 
wholesale depiction of the truth that his style can sometimes suffer from it and 
become rather dry and tedious in its analytical nature, Livy's focus upon writing 
history as a means of entertaining and of portraying a moral to the events of the past 
shows in his 'exuberant and abundant' style that frequently dramatizes the subject 
matter.11 And indeed, Livy himself states the following in the preface of Ab Urbe 
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Condita: 
ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui 
mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et 
parturn et auctum imperium sit; labente deinde paulatim disciplina 
velut desidentis primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis 
magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec 
tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum 
est. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.pr.9 
 
To those things for me anyone should fiercely direct their attention, 
what life, what morals were; through these men and by these arts of 
home and military service the empire was brought forth and increased; 
then gradually by slipping the disciplines how morals first fell 
followed by the mind, then how they slipped more and more, then 
began to go headfirst until we arrived at these times in which we are 
able to suffer neither our vices nor the remedies.12 
 
Unlike the objective-minded Polybius, Livy clearly has an agenda in writing the Ab 
Urbe Condita, and as will be demonstrated shortly, we must be vigilant for cases 
where his agenda could be harming the objectivity of his account.  
This is not to say though that Livy completely distorts the truth or is not 
diligent enough in his research; indeed, reading through any of his books (XXI-XXX) 
on the Punic Wars makes it readily apparent that Livy frequently consulted Polybius' 
Histories, particularly when it came to describing how the battles played out. An 
excellent example of this, along with the difference between the two men's styles, can 
be found in the two authors' depictions of the cavalry engagement at Cannae: 
ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων 
πελάσαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐποίουν οὗτοι μάχην ἀληθινὴν καὶ 
βαρβαρικήν: οὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ νόμους ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ 
κίνδυνος, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσάπαξ συμπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο συμπλεκόμενοι κατ᾽ 
ἄνδρα, παρακαταβαίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐκράτησαν οἱ 
παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν ἐν τῇ 
συμπλοκῇ, πάντων ἐκθύμως καὶ γενναίως διαγωνιζομένων τῶν 
Ῥωμαίων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἤλαυνον παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν φονεύοντες... 
Polybius Histories, 3.115.2-4 
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But when the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into 
collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly 
barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but 
having once met they dismounted and fought man to man. The 
Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in 
the melee, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began 
to drive the rest along the river, cutting them down mercilessly... 
 
deinde equitum Gallorum Hispanorumque laevum cornu cum dextro 
Romano concurrit, minime equestris more pugnae: frontibus enim 
adversis concurrendum erat quia nullo circa ad evagandum relicto 
spatio hinc amnis hinc peditum acies claudebant. in derectum utrimque 
nitentes stantibus ac confertis postremo turba equis vir virum 
amplexus detrahebat equo. pedestre magna iam ex parte certamen 
factum erat; acrius tamen quam diutius pugnatum est, pulsique Romani 
equites terga vertunt.  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 22.47.1-3 
 
Then the Gallic and Spanish horse which formed the left wing engaged 
with the Roman right in a combat very unlike a cavalry action. For 
they had to charge front to front, there being no room to move out 
round the flank, for the river shut them in on one side and the ranks of 
infantry on the other. Both parties pushed straight ahead, and as the 
horses came to a standstill, packed together in the throng, the riders 
began to grapple with their enemies and drag them from their seats. 
They were fighting on foot now, for the most part; but sharp though 
the struggle was, it was soon over, and the defeated Roman cavalry 
turned and fled.13  
 
 The details provided by each author match up almost perfectly, leaving little 
doubt that Livy used Polybius as his reference for this passage. The only difference 
between the two lies in their presentation. Whereas Polybius uses terse, military 
terminology (“νόμους ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ κίνδυνος”, “εἰσάπαξ 
συμπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο συμπλεκόμενοι κατ᾽ ἄνδρα”) when describing how the 
combat played out, Livy instead opts to present a more vivid and dramatic description 
of the fighting (“frontibus enim adversis concurrendum erat quia nullo circa ad 
evagandum relicto spatio”, “equis vir virum amplexus detrahebat equo. Pedestre 
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magna iam ex parte certamen factum erat”). This divergence in style owing to 
differences in background can be further seen when Livy chooses to insert a speech as 
a substitute for Polybius' analysis of consul Gaius Flaminius’ actions prior to the 
Battle of Lake Trasimene: 
παρεκάλει δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐν νῷ λαμβάνειν τί λέγειν εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ 
πατρίδι τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης σχεδὸν ἕως πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν 
Ῥώμην, αὐτῶν δὲ κατόπιν τῶν πολεμίων ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ 
στρατοπεδευόντων.  
Polybius Histories, 3.82.6 
 
Begging them to consider what would be said in Rome if, while the 
country was laid waste almost up to the walls, the army remained 
encamped in Etruria in the rear of the enemy.  
 
“immo Arreti ante moenia sedeamus” inquit; “hic enim patria et 
penates sunt. Hannibal emissus e manibus perpopuletur Italiam 
vastandoque et urendo omnia ad Romana moenia perveniat, nec ante 
nos hinc moverimus quam, sicut olim Camillum a Veis, C. Flaminium 
ab Arretio patres acciverint.”  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 22.3.10 
 
“Ay, truly! Let us sit still under the walls of Arretium, for here are our 
native city and our household gods; let Hannibal slip through our 
fingers and ravage Italy, and, laying waste and burning everything, 
march clear to Rome; and let us not move from this spot, till the 
Fathers, as once they summoned Camillus from Veii, shall summon 
Gaius Flaminius from Arretium.”  
 
The content is again extremely similar, leaving little doubt that Livy again used 
Polybius as his source. But instead of presenting it in an analytical manner as 
Polybius has, Livy chose to use his education in rhetoric to present a more 
entertaining version of the story. 
 There are several instances however where there are discrepancies between 
the actual content of Polybius and Livy. For many of these it is probable that Livy 
may have chosen to use sources other than Polybius. But for others, it may be the case 
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that Livy purposefully chose to exaggerate or distort what Polybius had presented as 
fact. One of the more egregious examples of this can be found when Livy presents his 
own version of how Hannibal's Numidian cavalry participated at Cannae: 
segne primo et a Punica coeptum fraude. quingenti ferme Numidae, 
praeter solita arma telaque gladios occultos sub loricis habentes, specie 
transfugarum cum ab suis parmas post terga habentes adequitassent, 
repente ex equis desiliunt parmisque et iaculis ante pedes hostium 
proiectis in mediam aciem accepti ductique ad ultimos considere ab 
tergo iubentur. ac dum proelium ab omni parte conseritur, quieti 
manserunt; postquam omnium animos oculosque occupaverat 
certamen, tum arreptis scutis, quae passim inter acervos caesorum 
corporum strata erant, aversam adoriuntur Romanam aciem tergaque 
ferientes ac poplites caedentes stragem ingentem ac maiorem aliquanto 
pavorem ac tumultum fecerunt.  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 22.48.2-5 
 
It began with a Punic ruse. About five hundred Numidians, who, in 
addition to their customary arms and missiles, carried swords 
concealed under their corslets, pretended to desert. Riding over from 
their own side, with their bucklers at their backs, they suddenly 
dismounted and threw down bucklers and javelins at the feet of their 
enemies. Being received into the midst of their ranks they were 
conducted to the rear and ordered to fall in behind. And while the 
battle was getting under way at every point, they kept quite still; but no 
sooner were the minds and eyes of all absorbed in the struggle, than 
they snatched up the shields which lay strewn about everywhere 
amongst the heaps of slain, and assailing the Romans from behind and 
striking at their backs and hamstrings, effected a great slaughter and a 
terror and confusion that were even greater.  
 
While Polybius does indeed include the Numidian attack on the rear of the Roman 
army, nowhere does he mention anything about it coming about due to a Carthaginian 
ruse. Instead, it simply occurs after the Roman cavalry wing has collapsed, and 
Hasdrubal leads the cavalry in an attack against the unprotected Roman infantry 
rearguard as part of Hannibal's entrapment plan. 
 Livy also occasionally differs from Polybius in what he presents as the causes 
for why an event played out in such a fashion. In his passage on the Battle of Lake 
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Trasimene, Polybius attributes the success of the Carthaginian ambush to Hannibal's 
knowledge and exploitation of the vices of the Roman general Gaius Flaminius: 
προπέτειά γε μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ 
τῦφος εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέστατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις.  
Polybius Histories, 3.81.9 
 
Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind 
anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken 
advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends. 
 
Livy also mentions the short temper and arrogance of Flaminius, but he makes no 
mention of Hannibal's exploitation of said traits, instead drawing attention to a very 
different set of consequences: 
consul ferox ab consulatu priore et non modo legum aut patrum 
maiestatis sed ne deorum quidem satis metuens.  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 22.3.4 
 
The consul had been proud and headstrong since his former 
consulship, and lacked all proper reverence, not only for the laws and 
for the senate's majesty, but even for the gods.  
 
 Livy says that Flaminius' downfall was ultimately caused not by Hannibal 
taking advantage of his impetuous nature, but rather his refusal to respect the will of 
the gods. Livy demonstrates how the gods had shown their disfavor with the inclusion 
of not one, but two evil omens prior to the battle: the collapse of Flaminius' own 
horse beneath him, and the inability of the standard-bearer to lift the standard from 
the ground.14 Both of these Flaminius chooses to ignore, and he, along with most of 
his army, perish in the subsequent battle. Livy is so determined to prove Flaminius' 
irreverence as being responsible for the Roman defeat that he depicts Quintus Fabius 
Maximus, the dictator who would soon experience great success against Hannibal and 
a figure of respect to the Roman reader,15 as coming to this conclusion following the 
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battle:  
ab dis orsus cum edocuisset patres plus neglegentia caerimoniarum 
auspiciorumque quam temeritate atque inscitia peccatum a C. Flaminio 
consule esse, quaeque piacula irae deum essent ipsos deos consulendos 
esse  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 22.9.7 
 
Taking up first the question of religion, he convinced the Fathers that 
the consul Flaminius had erred more through his neglect of the 
ceremonies and the auspices than through his recklessness and 
ignorance. 
 
 All of this is notably absent from Polybius' account, which leads us to 
conclude that this either came from an alternative source or was Livy's own 
invention. Even if the former is the case, the enthusiasm with which Livy latched on 
to the auspices is enough to make us suspicious of just how impartial Livy is. It is 
quite clear from examples such as this that he does have an agenda of glorifying 
traditional Roman virtues, and that this agenda does indeed affect the objectivity of 
his account.16 Furthermore, as discussed previously, Polybius' personal experience in 
political and military matters combined with the extraordinary lengths he went to in 
conducting research make him far more qualified than Livy when discussing the 
intricacies of classical warfare.17 Because of this, it is generally wiser to place more 
faith in the Histories than in the testimony of Ab Urbe Condita. But this is not to say 
that Livy is of no aid to us. At the very least, Livy provides us with a means of 
verifying the claims of Polybius through a second source. Furthermore, especially due 
to the fragmented nature of books V-XXXIX of the Histories, Livy often provides us 
with information that we could not find in Polybius' work. Even if much of this 
should not be taken at face value, it is pertinent nonetheless and should at least be 
taken into consideration. 
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Examination of Scipio’s Invasion of North Africa 
 It is now time to turn our attention to the main task at hand: the examination 
and analysis of Scipio’s and Hannibal’s actions both leading up to and during the 
battle, as detailed in the accounts of Polybius and Livy. Please note that I have opted 
to disperse the review of scholarship throughout the next few sections of the paper 
rather than address it all at once. This is due to many of the sub-topics each having 
their own separate scholarly discussions, making it more convenient to address them 
as they come up. One other detail I must draw attention to before beginning is the 
critical distinction between 'tactics' and 'strategy' in military matters: 'tactics' 
generally refer to small-scale maneuvers that are carried out during a battle by units 
of soldiers with the intent of achieving a specific objective, whereas 'strategy' refers 
to the overall campaign plans by which a leader or faction hopes to accomplish 
certain goals.18 An example of tactics would be a centurion ordering the legionaries 
under his command to rush through a gap in the Macedonian defensive line. An 
example of strategy would be Scipio choosing to stage an invasion of Carthaginian-
controlled Spain in order to deny them much needed men and resources. With that 
resolved, I shall now begin my analysis in earnest. 
ὅτι πάντων εὐδαιμονιζόντων τὸν Πόπλιον μετὰ τὸ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους 
ἐξελάσαι τῆς Ἰβηρίας, καὶ παρακαλούντων ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, 
ἐπεὶ πέρας ἐπιτέθεικε τῷ πολέμῳ, μακαρίζειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη διότι 
τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐλπίδας, αὐτὸς δὲ νῦν καὶ μάλιστα βουλεύεσθαι 
τίνα τρόπον ἄρξηται τοῦ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πολέμου: τὸν μὲν γὰρ 
πρὸ τούτου χρόνον Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις πεπολεμηκέναι, νυνὶ δὲ 
τὴν τύχην παραδεδωκέναι καιρὸν εἰς τὸ Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίοις 
ἐξενεγκεῖν πόλεμον.  
Polybius Histories, 11.24a.1-3 
 
When everyone congratulated Scipio on having driven the 
Carthaginians out of Spain and entreated him to rest and take his ease, 
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as he had put an end to the war, he said he considered them happy in 
having such hopes, but that for his own part now especially the time 
had come when he had to consider how he should begin the war 
against Carthage; for up to now the Carthaginians had been making 
war on the Romans, but now chance had given the Romans the 
opportunity of making war on the Carthaginians. 
 
 It was with these words in mind that Scipio set about raising an army for the 
purpose of invading North Africa, and in the spring of 204 BC, a Roman fleet landed 
on the North African coast just sixteen miles northeast of the city of Utica.19 His 
ultimate purpose? To threaten Carthage enough so as to draw Hannibal out of Italy 
and back to Carthaginian soil where he could inflict a decisive defeat on him.20 A 
survivor of Cannae, Scipio knew what Hannibal was capable of, and realized that this 
was the only way he could ensure the overall defeat of Carthage in the war.21 Upon 
landing, Scipio linked up with the Massylian prince Massinissa, whose allegiance he 
had already secured prior to the invasion, and whose cavalry contributions would be 
vital to the success of Scipio's campaign.22  
After defeating a small Carthaginian cavalry contingent sent against him, 
Scipio conquered the nearby Carthaginian town of Salaeca, and then proceeded to lay 
siege to the port city of Utica where he had originally landed. But his siege was cut 
short by the arrival of Carthaginian forces under the command of Hasdrubal and their 
allied army of King Syphax's Numidians. Badly outnumbered and wary of being 
caught between the city and the two armies, Scipio withdrew to a defensible 
promontory just east of Utica and prepared to encamp for winter.23 While there can be 
little doubt that the original attempted siege of Utica was a strategic error, Scipio 
recovers quickly and turns the situation to his advantage. After sending several 
envoys to see if Syphax's allegiance to the Carthaginians can be swayed in the same 
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manner that Massinissa's was, Scipio takes note of a promising opportunity: 
τῶν γὰρ διαπεμπομένων πρὸς τὸν Σόφακά τινες ἀνήγγειλαν αὐτῷ διότι 
συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους ἐκ παντοδαπῶν ξύλων καὶ 
φυλλάδος ἄνευ γῆς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ κατεσκευακέναι τὰς σκηνάς, 
τῶν δὲ Νομάδων τοὺς μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ καλάμων, τοὺς δ᾽ 
ἐπισυναγομένους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς 
φυλλάδος σκηνοποιεῖσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ἐντός, τοὺς δὲ πλείους αὐτῶν 
ἐκτὸς τῆς τάφρου καὶ τοῦ χάρακος. νομίσας οὖν ὁ Πόπλιος 
παραδοξοτάτην μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις, πραγματικωτάτην δὲ σφίσιν εἶναι 
τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπιβολήν, ἐγένετο περὶ ταύτην τὴν κατασκευήν.  
Polybius Histories, 14.1.6-8 
 
Some of his messengers to Syphax reported that the Carthaginians in 
their winter camp had made their huts from all kinds of wood and 
branches without any mixture of earth, that the first Numidians to 
arrive had constructed theirs with reeds, while the others who kept 
joining the army from the cities had used nothing but branches for the 
present, some of them being encamped inside but most outside the 
trench and palisade. Scipio, therefore, thinking that an attempt to fire 
the camp would be a complete surprise for the enemy and very 
serviceable to himself, began to take the necessary measures.  
 
 Scipio continued the talks for some more time, often sending in officers 
disguised as slaves with the envoys so as to gather intelligence on the enemy numbers 
and camp fortifications. And when the first signs of spring began to appear, Scipio 
enacted his plan. In order to properly catch the Numidians and Carthaginians off-
guard, Scipio launched his fleet and stationed two thousand infantry on the hill where 
he had previously encamped during his siege of Utica, as if he were about to lay siege 
to the city once again.24 This served the double purpose of protecting his camp 
against an attack by the garrison at Utica.25 But once night fell, Scipio readied the rest 
of the army and divided it into two forces, one under Scipio's direct command and the 
other under Massinissa and Scipio's own cavalry commander, Laelius. Under the 
cover of darkness, Laelius' contingent set fire to the Numidian camp, causing the 
Carthaginians, under the false impression that the fire was accidental, to emerge from 
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theirs, only to be attacked by Scipio's troops. Although Hasdrubal and Syphax 
managed to escape, most of their forces did not, and the operation was so successful 
that Polybius offers the following analysis:  
διὸ καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν εἰκάσαι δυνατὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν 
ὄντων ἐστίν: οὕτως ὑπερπεπαίκει τῇ δεινότητι πάσας τὰς 
προειρημένας πράξεις. ᾗ καὶ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν διειργασμένων 
Σκιπίωνι κάλλιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοὔργον καὶ παραβολώτατον 
τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων. 
Polybius Histories, 14.5.14-15 
 
So it is not possible to find any other disaster which even if 
exaggerated could be compared with this, so much did it exceed in 
horror all previous events. Therefore of all the brilliant exploits 
performed by Scipio this seems to me the most splendid and most 
adventurous. 
 
 And a disaster for the Carthaginians it most certainly was. With one daring 
and decisive strike, Scipio had effectively crippled Carthaginian forces in North 
Africa. Hasdrubal and Syphax would manage to round up and mobilize another army 
to oppose Scipio later that same spring, but they were quickly confronted and routed 
by Scipio and his legions at the Battle of the Great Plains. Syphax and Hasdrubal 
again managed to escape, although Syphax's reprieve was only temporary as he was 
pursued and subsequently captured by Laelius and Massinissa, thereby removing 
Carthage's most powerful ally. With their army now thoroughly in ruins, the 
Carthaginian senate convened for the purpose of determining how to salvage the 
situation. They made three decisions: first, to fortify the city to the best of their ability 
against an attack. Second, to send their fleet against Scipio's in an attempt to whittle 
down his support. And the third decision would prove to be the most fateful: 
ἐπί τε τὸν Ἀννίβαν πέμπειν ἠξίουν καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν 
ποιησαμένους ἐξελέγχειν καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα. 
Polybius Histories, 14.9.8 
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They also demanded that Hannibal should be summoned to return and 
that resource put to the test without any delay. 
 
 Hannibal was to return to North Africa. Scipio’s campaign had completely 
succeeded in attaining its primary goal of removing the Carthaginian threat from 
Italy. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation between two of the greatest 
generals of their time. 
Upon Hannibal’s Return to North Africa 
 But it did not happen immediately. After the failure of their naval attack to 
inflict any substantial damage against Scipio's forces, the Carthaginian senate sued 
for peace, and Scipio agreed after imposing fairly heavy reparations.26 This truce 
ultimately proved to be short-lived however when in the early spring of 202 BC fifty 
Carthaginian warships under the command of Hasdrubal captured a fleet of Roman 
transport ships that had been washed ashore due to a storm.27 Attempts at 
reconciliation only exacerbated the situation when Scipio's envoys were led into a 
trap by the Carthaginians and barely escaped with their lives.28 Livy states his belief 
that the Carthaginians never truly intended to uphold the treaty: 
ita dimissi Carthaginienses nullas recusandas condiciones pacis cum 
censuissent quippe qui moram temporis quaererent dum Hannibal in 
Africam traiceret. 
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 30.16.14 
 
Dismissed in such a way, the Carthaginians decreed that no conditions 
of peace should be refused, since surely they were seeking a delay of 
time while Hannibal crossed into Africa.29 
 
 And indeed, it hardly seems coincidental that the breaking of the truce 
happened to occur after Hannibal landed on the shores of North Africa at 
Hadrumentum.30 Whatever the case, hostilities had been renewed between the two 
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nations, but Hannibal refused to move from his newly established base, opting instead 
to try and build up his army.31 With his army diminished from the campaign in Italy, 
this was probably the soundest strategic move Hannibal could make in such 
circumstances.32 Scipio, knowing that waiting only gave Hannibal more time to 
organize his army, decided that the moment had come, and sent a messenger to 
Massinissa (who had been consolidating power in his own kingdom) requesting that 
he bring whatever cavalry he could muster and rendezvous in the densely populated 
and rich Medjerda valley. Recognizing the importance of this valley to the 
Carthaginians due to their reliance on its supplies, Scipio began laying waste to the 
region, sacking town after town.33 The ploy worked, and a panicked Carthaginian 
senate sent a delegation to Hannibal urging him to stop Scipio. Hannibal's initial 
response to the delegation was one of dismissal: 
ὁ δὲ διακούσας τοῖς μὲν παροῦσιν ἀπεκρίθη τἄλλα σκοπεῖν, περὶ δὲ 
τούτου ῥᾳθυμεῖν: διαλήψεσθαι γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτός.  
Polybius Histories, 15.5.2 
 
After listening to the messengers he bade them in reply pay attention 
to other matters and be at their ease about this; for he himself would 
judge when it was time.  
 
 This refusal most likely stemmed from Hannibal believing that his army was 
not properly prepared for an engagement with Scipio. But just a few days later, 
Hannibal broke camp and prepared his army to march. Barry Strauss makes an 
interesting observation in his book, Masters of Command, that Hannibal may have 
missed an opportunity here because Massinissa's cavalry had yet to link up with 
Scipio's army. If Hannibal had moved quickly, he might have been able to engage 
Scipio before the latter got his much needed cavalry reinforcements. However, 
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Strauss also notes that there was no guarantee that Scipio would choose to meet 
Hannibal in battle at such a time, and Hannibal would have had little means of forcing 
him to do so.34 
 It was at this stage that Scipio was in almost total control. Hannibal had to 
fight him on his terms, at a battlefield of his choosing. And when his forces caught 
several Carthaginian spies attempting to gather intelligence on his location and forces, 
Scipio chose to not only spare them but actually have a military tribune escort them 
around camp, pointing out all of the important aspects of Scipio's army.35 This seems 
like a very questionable decision on Scipio's part until it is revealed that Massinissa's 
forces did not arrive until the very next day, so therefore Hannibal was given false 
information regarding how strong his enemy was.36 However, Livy reports that 
Massinissa and his forces had already arrived by the time the spies were caught, in 
which case Scipio may have instead been attempting to lower Carthaginian morale by 
demonstrating the superiority of his own army.37 Regardless of the reason, this 
prompted Hannibal, supposedly impressed by Scipio's magnanimity, to send word 
that he wished to meet with the Roman general one-on-one. With Massinissa's forces 
now reinforcing his own, this presented Scipio with an opportunity that he did not 
squander: 
ἀνέζευξε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς πρὸς πόλιν Ναράγαρα 
κατεστρατοπέδευσε, πρός τε τἄλλα τόπον εὐφυῆ καταλαβόμενος καὶ 
τὴν ὑδρείαν ἐντὸς βέλους ποιησάμενος. κἀντεῦθεν ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τὸν 
τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, φάσκων ἕτοιμος εἶναι συμπορεύεσθαι 
πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς λόγους. ὧν ἀκούσας Ἀννίβας ἀνέζευξε, καὶ συνεγγίσας, 
ὥστε μὴ πλεῖον ἀπέχειν τριάκοντα σταδίων, κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρός 
τινα λόφον, ὃς τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν 
ἐδόκει, τὴν δ᾽ ὑδρείαν ἀπωτέρω μικρὸν εἶχε: καὶ πολλὴν ταλαιπωρίαν 
ὑπέμενον οἱ στρατιῶται περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος,  
Polybius Histories, 15.5.14-6.2 
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He then broke up his camp and on reaching a town called Naragara 
encamped there, selecting a spot which was favourably situated in 
other respects and had water within the throw of a javelin. From here 
he sent to the Carthaginian general saying that he was now ready for 
the meeting. When Hannibal heard this he broke up his camp and on 
getting within a distance of not more than thirty stades of the Romans 
encamped on a hill which appeared to be convenient for his present 
design, but was rather too far away from water, and indeed his men 
suffered considerable hardship owing to this.  
 
 Scipio had secured yet another advantage for himself, for a well hydrated man 
will generally perform better in battle than a dehydrated one. The meeting itself failed 
to achieve any reconciliation between the two factions, although whether either of 
them was expecting it to do so is doubtful, and so each general prepared his army for 
the battle that would take place the very next day. 
The Battle of Zama Begins 
ad hoc discrimen procedunt postero die duorum opulentissimorum 
populorum duo longe clarissimi duces, duo fortissimi exercitus, multa 
ante parta decora aut cumulaturi eo die aut euersuri.  
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 30.32.4 
 
On the next day, to this battle advanced two of the most renowned 
leaders, and two of the strongest armies, of two of the wealthiest 
peoples, on that day either for the many distinctions acquired before to 
be heaped upon, or to wipe them clean. 
 
 Such was the scale of this battle. It is difficult to determine how many troops 
each general had since neither Polybius nor Livy offer any overall figures for this, but 
most scholars have come to the consensus that Hannibal's infantry outnumbered 
Scipio's by a fair margin (Lazenby provides an estimate of 36,000 to 29,000), while 
Scipio had a significant advantage in cavalry (Lazenby's estimates put these at 6,100 
to Hannibal's 4,000).38 Hannibal also had eighty of the dreaded war elephants at his 
disposal which were drawn up in front of his army.39 The two armies had formed up 
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in fairly standard formation: each had divided their infantry into three battle lines, 
with Hannibal placing his mercenaries in the first row, his recently recruited 
Carthaginian levies in the second, and the battle-hardened veterans of his Italian 
campaign in the third row. Scipio meanwhile had, as was the usual custom of the 
Roman army prior to Gaius Marius' reforms, placed the younger and lesser 
experienced hastati in the first line, the more experienced and better-armed principes 
in the second line, and the veteran triarii in the final line. However, Scipio had 
deviated slightly from the typical formation in that the maniples of principes were 
stationed directly behind those of the hastati, rather than in between them, thereby 
forming neat battle lanes that extended throughout his entire army. Scipio then 
stationed his skirmishers, the velites, in the intervals between the hastati maniples, a 
curious tactic to be sure.40 As for the cavalry, both generals separated them into two 
groups and placed one on each flank, with Scipio putting Massinissa's cavalry on the 
right flank, and Laelius' on the left. The battlefield that the two armies had assembled 
on had been chosen well by Scipio: flat plains, so that Massinissa and Laelius could 
exercise the Romans' superiority in cavalry unimpeded by any obstacles or rough 
terrain. 
 The beginning of the battle quickly revealed why Scipio had arranged his 
infantry in such an unusual manner:  
τεροι. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἑκατέροις ἦν εὐτρεπῆ τὰ πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, πάλαι 
τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἱππέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολιζομένων, τότε 
παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων Ἀννίβας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ 
τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ συμπεσόντα τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων 
γροσφομάχοις ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χωρίῳ τῶν παρατάξεων πολλὰ μὲν ἔπασχε 
κακά, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐποίει τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἕως ὅτου πεφοβημένα τὰ μὲν 
διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐξέπεσε, δεξαμένων αὐτὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων 
ἀσφαλῶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόνοιαν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος 
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παραφυγόντα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων συνακοντιζόμενα τέλος εἰς τὸν ἔξω 
τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐξέπεσεν... 
Polybius Histories, 15.12.1-4 
 
When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse 
having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal 
ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the 
trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the 
animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the 
Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and 
Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was 
soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman 
velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and 
suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped 
through the gaps in the Roman line which Scipio's foresight had 
provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled 
towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of 
javelins, at length escaped out of the field. 
 
 The majority of the forces on each side had yet to engage, and already Scipio 
had turned the battle in his favor by not only neutralizing Hannibal's war elephants 
with minimal loss to his own troops, but also with his cavalry taking advantage of the 
panic caused by the elephants running amok to catch the opposing cavalry off-guard. 
Laelius followed shortly after Massinissa, and together they easily routed the 
Carthaginian cavalry on both flanks. Whether or not the flight of his cavalry was 
intentional on Hannibal's part is a point of contention among scholars, and one which 
we will return to shortly. Regardless of whether it was feigned or not, the retreat of 
the Carthaginian cavalry took Scipio's cavalry out of the battle for the time being due 
to their pursuit. All that was left on both sides were the infantry, and this was where 
the hardest fighting of the battle would take place. Both armies advanced upon each 
other, and when the two front lines had drawn near the other, the hastati charged 
Hannibal's mercenaries. Here is where discrepancies between Livy's and Polybius' 
accounts emerge; Livy states that: 
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Igitur primo impetu extemplo movere loco hostium aciem Romani. 
Livy Ab Urbe Condita, 30.34.3 
 
Therefore immediately upon the first attack the Romans moved the 
battle line of enemies from that place.  
 
Nor do the second line of Carthaginian levies fare much better against the Romans in 
Livy's account. Polybius on the other hand depicts the hastati as encountering more 
resistance:  
πάσης δ᾽ οὔσης ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα τῆς μάχης [διὰ τὸ μὴ δόρασι 
μηδὲ ξίφεσι χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους], τῇ μὲν εὐχερείᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ 
προεῖχον οἱ μισθοφόροι τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον τῶν 
Ῥωμαίων, τῷ δὲ τῆς συντάξεως ἀκριβεῖ καὶ τῷ καθοπλισμῷ 
πιστεύοντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐπέβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.  
Polybius Histories, 15.13.1-2 
 
As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair the men using not spears 
but swords, the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and 
skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to 
advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of 
their arms.  
 
 As discussed earlier, Livy's openly pro-Roman bias makes him the less 
reliable source here, but even so it should be noted that even in Polybius' version the 
casualties suffered by the Romans against the mercenaries, and subsequently against 
the levies, could not have been all that heavy due to Polybius' after battle report of the 
Romans suffering 1,500 dead, especially since the majority of these casualties would 
undoubtedly have occurred when they went up against Hannibal's veterans. Although 
the specifics of the enemy's resistance differ between the two, both Polybius and Livy 
agree that Hannibal’s mercenaries soon give way and are prevented from withdrawing 
into the ranks of the Carthaginian levies in the second line, and the levies supposedly 
end up having to fight both the mercenaries and the advancing Roman hastati, 
inflicting some damage upon both before also retreating. And just like the 
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mercenaries, they are not admitted into the final line of Hannibal's veterans, and the 
survivors of both the first and second lines are forced to go around while being fought 
and pursued by the hastati, who actually break rank during their engagement with and 
subsequent pursuit of the levies, forcing the officers of the principes to initially 
advance their own troops and restore the order of the Roman first line.41  
 Now all that remained of Hannibal's army were his veterans, the men who had 
fought with him through thick and thin in Italy, and with whom he now stood ready to 
face the legionaries' assault. The fighting did not start between the two immediately; 
Hannibal, perhaps noting the difficulty that Scipio's troops would have in crossing a 
battlefield that was now covered with corpses and abandoned weapons, held his 
position, waiting for Scipio to make his move.42 And Scipio for his part chose not to 
press the attack immediately, instead giving his exhausted front line a much needed 
break and then reforming the entire army up into one row, with the principes and the 
triarii on the wings and the hastati in the center.43 With this carried out, the final stage 
of the battle began:  
ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ τοῖς 
καθοπλισμοῖς παραπλησίων ἀμφοτέρων, ἄκριτον ἐπὶ πολὺ συνέβαινε 
γενέσθαι τὴν μάχην, ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς χώραις ἐναποθνησκόντων τῶν 
ἀνδρῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν, ἕως οἱ περὶ τὸν Μασαννάσαν καὶ Λαίλιον ἀπὸ 
τοῦ διώγματος τῶν ἱππέων ἀνακάμπτοντες [καὶ] δαιμονίως εἰς δέοντα 
καιρὸν συνῆψαν. ὧν προσπεσόντων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατόπιν οἱ 
μὲν πλεῖστοι κατεκόπησαν ἐν τῇ τάξει, τῶν δὲ πρὸς φυγὴν 
ὁρμησάντων ὀλίγοι μὲν τελέως διέφυγον, ἅτε τῶν ἱππέων ἐν χερσὶν 
ὄντων καὶ τῶν τόπων ἐπιπέδων ὑπαρχόντων.  
Polybius Histories, 15.14.6-9 
 
As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, 
and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the 
men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa 
and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived 
providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's 
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army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, 
while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the 
cavalry were close on them and the country was level.  
 
 And so ended the Battle of Zama. Hannibal managed to escape, but the defeat 
was so disastrous that when he came to the senate house at Carthage, he advised the 
senators to accept the treaty that the Romans proposed. The senators offered no 
opposition, and immediately sent envoys with orders to accept the terms at once.44 
Scipio, now known as Scipio Africanus, had succeeded in defeating the most 
formidable general of the age and bringing the greatest threat to Roman power to its 
knees. 
Review of Scholarship 
 But what was ultimately responsible for Hannibal's defeat? What prevented 
him from repeating his extraordinary victories from the beginning of the war? 
Polybius and Livy (whose conclusion was most likely drawn from Polybius' due to 
their striking similarities) are largely unhelpful on this matter.  Both reiterate 
Hannibal's overall battle plan, drawing attention to his infantry tactics of letting the 
first two lines weary the legionaries so that by the time they got to Hannibal's fresh 
veterans they would be fatigued and their swords dulled.45 And both conclude that 
Hannibal had taken every possible measure to secure victory: 
εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ ποιήσας πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν ἐσφάλη τὸν πρὸ τούτου 
χρόνον ἀήττητος ὤν, συγγνώμην δοτέον: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὅτε καὶ 
ταὐτόματον ἀντέπραξε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε 
πάλιν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν. 
Polybius Histories, 15.16.5-6 
 
If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible 
step to insure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For 
there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and 
again at times, as the proverb says, "A brave man meets another braver 
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yet," as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.  
 
They fail to specify anything beyond the battle though, and one cannot help but 
wonder if, especially in Livy's case, they were extolling Hannibal's tactical prowess 
for the purpose of making Scipio's victory over him seem all the more magnificent.  
 Modern scholars meanwhile are divided on this. The two most predominant 
schools of thought are: 1) That Hannibal's loss had little to do with mistakes on his 
part. The forces arrayed against him were simply too strong for what he had been 
given. 2) Scipio proved to be the better general on the strategic level, outmaneuvering 
Hannibal and gaining the advantage over him well before the battle even began. 
 For those who subscribe to the first theory, the chief examples being J.F. 
Lazenby, Harold Lamb, Theodor Mommsen, and Hans Delbruck, their most 
commonly cited shortcoming of Hannibal's forces are his cavalry, which I had 
mentioned earlier as being a point of contention.46 These scholars maintain that 
Scipio simply had too strong an advantage in his cavalrymen, especially due to their 
numerical superiority.  With Hannibal at such a disadvantage in horsemen, it is 
unsurprising that the cavalry engagement played out as it did. And with Scipio's 
veteran legionaries ultimately proving capable of matching even Hannibal's best 
infantrymen, this superiority in cavalry gave Scipio all he needed to prove victorious 
in the ensuing battle. Several authors, including those who aren’t full advocates of 
this theory such as Gabriel and Lancel, note that the routing of his cavalry and their 
pursuit by the Romans may have been fully intentional on Hannibal's part, suggesting 
that he was fully aware of his weakness in cavalry and by having them retreat and 
draw away their Roman counterparts, he could perhaps gain the advantage with his 
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greater numbers of infantry and the presence of his veterans from the Italy 
campaign.47  
Lazenby points out however that this is purely conjecture, and that even if this 
were his plan, it involved a great deal of risk in assuming either that the Roman 
cavalry would not then turn on his infantry's flanks or that they would not return in 
time to attack his rear. Regardless of how he handled his weakness in cavalry, the 
proponents of this school of thought place special emphasis on how lopsided the two 
factions' cavalry forces were, with Lazenby, Lamb, and Delbruck even going so far as 
to claim that the battle might have gone very differently if Scipio did not have his 
advantage in cavalry.48 Lazenby and Strauss have also stated that they believe 
Hannibal to have had a disadvantage in his infantry as well, due to his veterans being 
lesser in number than the veteran legionaries of Scipio, and especially since a third of 
Hannibal's infantry were nothing more than levies.49  
 Lazenby in particular takes this even further by offering several paragraphs of 
reasons why Scipio was no better a general than Hannibal in the end, going so far as 
to use the following sentence at one point: “As strategists, too, both men were clear-
sighted and bold, but it is astonishing that anyone should rate Scipio higher in this 
respect, for although the strategy in Spain was skillful and successful, the problems 
he had to face were nothing compared to the problems Hannibal had to face in 
Italy.”50 While some of Lazenby's arguments are fairly sound, others are quite 
speculative, and his choice of vocabulary in the above quote leads me to question 
how neutral he is on the subject, especially since he continues to use similar 
vocabulary in the subsequent passages.51 I will provide my own counter-arguments to 
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this shortly.  
 Those who subscribe to the second theory, the chief proponents here being 
James Lacey (along with co-author Williamson Murray), Victor Davis Hanson, Barry 
Strauss, and Richard Gabriel, most commonly refer to the battle's prelude, and how 
Scipio effectively determined where and when the battle would take place, in a very 
similar manner to how Hannibal forced the Romans to fight on battlefields of his 
choosing during his rampage through Italy several years prior. And indeed, there can 
be little doubt that the younger Scipio learned his strategy in maneuvering of the army 
from the very man he was destined to face on the plains before Zama. But whereas 
Hannibal had achieved very little strategic success in Italy even after the greatest of 
his victories at Cannae, Scipio achieved remarkable results, excelling not only in 
using maneuvering to his advantage, but also political intrigue.52 He had shown this 
in Spain, and he showed it again in North Africa through his siege of Utica, the defeat 
of the Carthaginian and Numidian armies that were sent to relieve it, and how he 
handled the Carthaginians suing for peace.53  
This strategic prowess is further demonstrated in his attacking the valley of 
Medjerda, which caused a panicked Carthaginian senate to place pressure on 
Hannibal to defeat Scipio quickly and decisively.54 In addition to forcing Hannibal to 
fight on Scipio's terms, this move also denied Hannibal the time he needed to recruit 
and sufficiently train the army that would be going up against Scipio's experienced 
and disciplined legionaries.55 In this manner, proponents of this school of thought are 
arguing that the previous theory (i.e. that Hannibal lost due to a shortage of reliable 
troops and therefore the loss had little to do with Scipio being the better general) is 
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moot since Scipio was actually already responsible for Hannibal's disadvantage in 
troops.  
Furthermore, the choice of location had left Hannibal more than eighty miles 
away from his original base, and on open terrain no less.56 This meant that there could 
be absolutely no retreat for Hannibal's forces, since Scipio's cavalry, with no rough 
terrain to hinder the horses, could easily run them down should they try to flee. In this 
way, Scipio had all but ensured not only a tactical defeat of Hannibal's army, but also 
a strategic defeat of Carthage in general, since it would be left with no armed forces 
to resist the victorious Romans.57 Hence, according to this theory, while Hannibal 
ultimately lost the battle because the odds were so heavily stacked against him, the 
only reason they were so heavily in Scipio's favor was because Scipio himself had 
already made them that way through his careful planning and intrigue, leaving the 
Carthaginian army with so little a chance at victory that, as Strauss puts it, "Hannibal 
should have known, even if his countrymen did not, that he could not pull off a 
miracle.”58 It is to this second school of thought that I subscribe, for all of the reasons 
listed above, and along with my own arguments that Hannibal made mistakes, both 
strategic and tactical, that he could not afford to make given his position. 
My Thoughts on the Causes of the Battle’s Outcome 
 My argument will be made in the context of addressing the points made by 
Lazenby, whom I consider to be the staunchest proponent of the first theory. As I 
mentioned earlier, Lazenby stated in Hannibal's War that he was in disbelief that 
anyone could rate Scipio higher than Hannibal as a strategist, calling Scipio's invasion 
of North Africa “obvious and pedestrian” compared to the “breathtaking boldness” 
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with which Hannibal invaded Italy.59 He continues by stating that one should not 
judge each of these campaigns solely based on how well they achieved their ultimate 
goals, but rather in how much they accomplished proportional to the amount of 
resources at their disposal.60 It is certainly true that Hannibal's invasion of Italy 
through the Alps was utterly impressive, and that by comparison Scipio's amphibious 
invasion is hardly outstanding. It is also quite true that the amount of opposition 
Hannibal faced in Italy was far stronger than anything Scipio faced in either Spain or 
Africa, due not only to the greater manpower that Rome had at its disposal, but also 
because the legionaries he was fighting against were the world's deadliest infantry.61 
In light of this, it can be said that Scipio's victories prior to Zama pale in comparison 
to the magnificence of Hannibal's victories, particularly at Cannae.  
But my response to this is to point out that these are testaments to Hannibal's 
tactical genius, not his strategic genius. Each of his victories, while brilliant in and of 
themselves, ultimately had little to no strategic effect on Rome's capabilities. Even 
after the catastrophic losses suffered at Cannae, Rome had legions retrained and ready 
to fight in no more than a year following the battle.62 For all of its “breathtaking 
boldness,” Hannibal's campaign in Italy accomplished nothing more than killing a lot 
of Roman soldiers (along with their Italian allies). And yet, despite the obvious 
overall failure of his campaign, he persisted at this for nearly two decades, with 
steadily diminishing returns.63 Contrast this to Scipio's campaigns in both Spain and 
Africa, in which every one of his victories brought him steadily closer to achieving 
his ultimate goal: the surrender of Carthage.64 
 And then of course there is Hannibal's involvement, or almost complete lack 
34 
thereof, in preventing Scipio's African campaign from gaining any ground. Scipio's 
invasion of Africa was in no way a surprise to the Carthaginians. Indeed, they were so 
aware of his designs that while he was assembling an invasion force in Sicily, the 
Carthaginian senate sent envoys to entice King Philip V of Macedon to stage an 
invasion of either Sicily or Italy, promising great compensation were he to do so.65 
They also sent Carthaginian reinforcements under the command of Mago to Italy for 
the purpose of tying down some of Rome's legions in Italy, thereby preventing them 
from aiding in the invasion. And during all this time, Hannibal accomplished nothing 
of strategic importance other than posing a small threat to Italy. As shown earlier, he 
would not make any effort to stop Scipio's advance until the Carthaginian senate's 
delegation arrived in Italy and demanded that he return at once to North Africa. 
Lazenby is quick to undermine Scipio's victory by noting the inferior quality of the 
majority of Hannibal's troops, particularly the hastily raised levies,66 but he fails to 
note that these were all that were left of Carthage's military forces because Scipio had 
already destroyed everything else. Had Hannibal arrived earlier, he might have been 
able to take command of Hasdrubal's army and stand a better chance at defeating 
Scipio, especially since at that stage the Romans would have been pinned down at 
Utica. By choosing to ignore Scipio's invasion in favor of maintaining his fruitless 
Italian campaign, Hannibal ultimately left himself with little means of defeating 
Scipio. 
 Furthermore, I am not at all convinced that Hannibal's tactical performance at 
Zama was any better than Scipio's, as Lazenby and Lamb implied through their 
assertion that the battle might have gone very differently if Hannibal did not have 
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such a disadvantage in cavalry numbers or troop quality overall.67 This is not to say 
that Hannibal's tactics in the battle were poor; given the disadvantage Scipio had 
placed him in, he and his army acquitted themselves quite well. But it is my belief 
that whatever chance Hannibal's tactics had at being called superior to Scipio's was 
ruined by the fiasco that was his elephant charge, and more significantly his inaction 
when an opportunity presented itself at a crucial moment in the battle. 
 I find it, at the very least, to be surprising that none of the authors on Zama 
offered anything more than a cursory overview of the elephant charge. If we are to 
take Polybius' word for it, the attack did not just fail to inflict any actual damage upon 
the Roman forces (Polybius stated that some of the velites suffered losses from the 
elephants, but it should be noted that we do not see any more references to these 
skirmishers for the duration of the battle, thereby implying that the part they played 
afterward, if any, had little to no effect on the battle's outcome); it actually proved to 
be a liability to Hannibal's army since some of the elephants ran amok and 
subsequently created a panic among the Carthaginian cavalry.68 This proved to be 
disastrous, since the outnumbered Carthaginian cavalry were put at an even greater 
disadvantage by Laelius and Massinissa catching them off-guard and unprepared due 
to their panic.69 Hannibal needed them to hold off Scipio's cavalry for as long as they 
were able (as proven by their return instantly turning the infantry stalemate into a 
crushing Roman victory), and the failure of the elephants cost him precious time in 
this regard. One could argue that the elephants were not properly trained and 
therefore Hannibal was not at fault for this; but this too I am unable to credit, since it 
not only recalls the argument that Hannibal's overall lack of preparedness for the 
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battle was ultimately Scipio's doing, but also because Hannibal should have 
recognized the risks involved in using untrained war elephants, and therefore he is 
responsible for all of the consequences. Perhaps this was Hannibal recognizing that 
he was at a disadvantage in this battle, and he was willing to take the risk if it could 
potentially give him the edge he needed. But I doubt this is the case, mainly because 
most of Hannibal's decisions were made based on caution rather than on risk-taking, 
as I shall demonstrate in this next argument. 
 Recall, if you will, the interlude between the Roman routing of the second 
infantry line of Hannibal's army and the melee battle between Hannibal's veterans and 
Scipio's remaining legionaries. At this moment, much of Scipio's army (primarily his 
hastati and some of his principes) was exhausted from having to cut through the 
Carthaginian mercenaries and levies, and has just had to reform after the ranks of the 
hastati were temporarily broken.70 Meanwhile, Hannibal's veteran infantrymen are 
completely fresh and ready for battle. Rather than pressing the attack, Scipio chooses 
to hold position temporarily while his men convey the wounded to the rear and then 
reform their entire battle line.71 Hannibal does the same, choosing to stand his ground 
rather than march across the corpse-ridden ground. This I believe was a tactical 
misstep on his part.  
Consider the circumstances: Scipio's army is in the process of reorganizing, 
and a large portion of his men are already battle fatigued and therefore not in the best 
condition to fight. And while Scipio's disciplined legionaries would have been able to 
form very quickly to receive the attack, they most likely would not have been in an 
ideal position to withstand the assault.72 It is entirely possible though that Hannibal's 
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ranks would have broken up too much passing over the fallen and their scattered 
weapons, and this would have given Scipio the opportunity to repeat his favored 
tactic of enveloping the enemy with his principes and triarii.73 A risk to be sure, and 
one that could have proven disastrous, so perhaps Hannibal had wisely decided to let 
Scipio make the risky move of advancing.  
But these are the actions of a general who has time on his side and does not 
have to worry about any external factors other than the army that is currently facing 
him. And this was not at all the case for Hannibal and his army. For somewhere out 
on the plains near the battlefield were the cavalrymen of Massinissa and Laelius, and 
it was only a matter of time before they decided to stop their pursuit of the 
Carthaginian horsemen and return to the main battle. And as history has 
demonstrated, their arrival would herald the doom of Carthage should Hannibal's 
veterans still be locked in combat with Scipio's legionaries. It was nothing short of 
folly for the Carthaginians and their general to play the waiting game (and serves as 
additional evidence that Hannibal’s tactics were in no way superior to Scipio’s), for of 
all the great military commanders in history, few were more aware of what a well-
placed and well-timed cavalry attack could do to an army than Hannibal Barca.74 
Conclusion 
 It is on account of these reasons that I have come to the conclusion that 
Hannibal lost to Scipio Africanus at the Battle of Zama because he not only proved to 
be incapable of countering Scipio's superb strategy leading up to the confrontation, 
but also failed to outplay Scipio on a tactical level. While it is debatable whether or 
not there was anything he could have done to ultimately prevent Scipio's strategy, 
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what I believe is not debatable is that he did not even try to until it was already too 
late. He failed to learn from the failure of his strategic goals in Italy, and this 
ultimately led not only to his eventual defeat, but also to the ultimate destruction of 
Carthage half a century later, thereby ensuring the rise of Rome to dominion of the 
Mediterranean. 
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